INTEGRITY OF ELECTIONS
In 2018, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine published a report called Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy. The report "examined the challenges arising out of the 2016 federal election, assessed current technology and standards for voting, and recommended steps that the federal government, state and local governments, election administrators, and vendors of voting technology should take to improve the security of election infrastructure. In doing so, the report provides a vision of voting that is more secure, accessible, reliable, and verifiable." Read the entire report here.
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine are private, nonprofit institutions that provide independent, objective analysis and advice to the nation to solve complex problems and inform public policy decisions related to science, technology, and medicine. The National Academies operate under an 1863 congressional charter to the National Academy of Sciences, signed by President Lincoln.
* The text below is taken directly from the report.
Evidence:
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. "Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy." Washington, DC: The National
Academies Press. 2018
Election Cybersecurity
Election systems should continue to be considered as U.S. Department of Homeland Security-designated critical infrastructure.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission and U.S. Department of Homeland Security should continue to develop and maintain a detailed set of cybersecurity best practices for state and local election officials. Election system vendors and state and local election officials should incorporate these best practices into their operations.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission should closely monitor the expenditure of funds made available to the states for election security through the 2018 omnibus appropriations bill to ensure that the funds enhance security practices and do not simply replace local dollars with federal support for ongoing activities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission should closely monitor any future federal funding designated to enhance election security.
Congress should provide funding for state and local governments to improve their cybersecurity capabilities on an ongoing basis.
Election Auditing
Each state should require a comprehensive system of post-election audits of processes and outcomes. These audits should be conducted by election officials in a transparent manner, with as much observation by the public as is feasible, up to limits imposed to ensure voter privacy.
Jurisdictions should conduct audits of voting technology and processes (for voter registration, ballot preparation, voting, election reporting, etc.) after each election. Privacy-protected audit data should be made publicly available to permit others to replicate audit results.
Audits of election outcomes should include manual examination of statistically appropriate samples of paper ballots cast.
States should mandate risk-limiting audits prior to the certification of election results. With current technology, this requires the use of paper ballots. States and local jurisdictions should implement risk-limiting audits within a decade. They should begin with pilot programs and work toward full implementation. Risk-limiting audits should be conducted for all federal and state election contests, and for local contests where feasible.
State and local jurisdictions purchasing election systems should ensure that the systems will support cost-effective risk-limiting audits.
State and local jurisdictions should conduct and assess pilots of end-to-end-verifiable election systems in elections using paper ballots.
Internet Voting
At the present time, the Internet (or any network connected to the Internet) should not be used for the return of marked ballots.13,14 Further, Internet voting should not be used in the future until and unless very robust guarantees of security and verifiability are developed and in place, as no known technology guarantees the secrecy, security, and verifiability of a marked ballot transmitted over the Internet.
U.S. Election Assistance Commission standards and state laws should be revised to support pilot programs to explore and validate new election technologies and practices. Election officials are encouraged to seek expert and public comment on proposed new election technology before it is piloted.